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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the language of the Purchase Agreement
(Addendum Exhibit "E") between Marveon and Young Electric
Sign Company was not sufficient t :> i: equ ire the (defendant Young
Electric Sign Company to indemnify Marveon for Its own
negligence.
Whether indemnification is not the proper of measure
of damages for breach of contract.
Whether Young Electric Sign Company did not have a
duty to provide insurance to Marveon under the terms of the
Purchase Agreement (Addendum Exh Ifai t "E").

REFERENCE TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals upon which
this Petition lor Writ of Certiorari is premised maj be
found at Pickhover v. Smithfs Management Corp., 106 Utah
Adv. Rpt. 43 (April 11, 19 8 9 Amended Opinion).

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
The date of the decision for which Young Electric
Sign Company requests this Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
April .

1989.

On May 11, 1989, the appellant Young Electric Sign
Company requested an Ex Parte Order for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Certiorari, which was signed by the Honorable
Justice Richard G. Howe on May 11, 1989, within the
prescribed period of time for such an order.

That order

granted the appellant, Young Electric Sign Company, to and
including June 12, 1989, to file its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
Jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the above-entitled
action is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1988) and pursuant to Rule 42,
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There appear to be no provisions of the Utah
Constitution, Utah Code Annotated, or other regulations that
are determinative of the issues in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition.
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari comes as a

result of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Third Judicial District Court,
Judge Scott Daniels presiding, which granted a Motion for
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Partial Summary Judgment to Marveon, Inc. , (hereinafter
referred to as "Marveon11) against the defendant and appellant,
Young E] eotri c S icfin Company (here ina fte:i: referred to as
"YESCO11 ')

Pickhover v. Smith's Mana g erne n t Corp.. , 10 6 Utah

Adv. Rpt

~ (April ] ] i 1989 Amended Opinion )

The appeal

to this Court, wh ich was initial] y referred to the Court of

survivors of Johi i, W, Pickhover,

Oi 1 January 5, 198 5, a s:i gn

fell off the si de of a Smith*s Food King located at
approxi mately 9 4 00 Soi ith 2 3 00 Ea s t :ii i i Sandy, Utah

The s :i :p I

Subsequent to that, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit naming YESCO
and Marveon, among others, as defendants,

Marveon filed its

: f a Pi irehase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO1 whereby
Marveon argued that YESCO was required to indemnify Marveon I; .o
the fu] ] extent of any judgment :i i I the action i lp to
$]

0 00 0 00

Tl i = t r :i a ] • ::::«:: i u : I: g :i ram: I t = .• I I Ian < reoi i s 1 lo !:::i :: i i f :: i :

Summary Judgment on October 31, 3 98 6, and certified the summary
judgment as a final order pursuant to Rul e 54(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, oi I January 2

1987.

The appeal process

then ensued.
Oral argument was held before the Utah Court of
Appeals on Tuesday, November 29, 1988.
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Oi i February 10, 1989,

the Court of Appeals filed its Opinion.

Pickhover v,

Smith's Management Corp., 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. (February 10,
1989) . Subsequently, the respondent, Marveon, filed a Petition
for Rehearing on February 22, 1989.

The hearing on that

request for rehearing was held on April 4, 1989, and an Amended
Opinion was entered along with an Order on Rehearing on
April 11, 1989.

The Order vacated the prior Opinion and

substituted the Amended Opinion which affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

On May 11, 1989, the appellate YESCO filed

its Ex Parte Request for Order for Extension of Time, which was
assigned by the Honorable Justice Richard G. Howe on May 11,
1989.
B.

This Petition is now offered for review by the Court.

Statement of Facts.
1.

John W. Pickhover was killed on January 5,

1985, when a sign fell off a Smith's Food King store located
at approximately 9400 South 2300 East, Sandy, Utah.
2.

The sign had been installed by the defendant

Marveon Sign Company in August of 1978.
3.

(R. at 5.)

(R. at 4.)

In August of 1981, Young Electric Sign

Company negotiated for and bought the assets of Marveon.

Among

the assets purchased by Marveon were certain maintenance
contracts, including a maintenance contract for Smith's Food
King store located at Sandy, Utah.

-4-

(R. at 328.)

4

The Purchase Agreement embodying the

agreement between YESCO and Marveon w a s signed on August; 2 8,
1981.

(R. at 335 )
5

II: I = I i in ::l:iase Agn eemei l t: between

YESCO, attached as Exhibit " E , " provi des that YESCO obtain
"insurance coverage adequate to full y protect [Marveon] against
persona] :1 nji in y or dc= .ath claims ari si ng out of the
ownership, maintenance, use i ser ' ' i ze ., transpor tatioi l. • :::)r
installation of displays i n a minimum amount of one nil 11 ion
dollars ($1,000,00.00)

(Purchase Agreement, Section 2,a

at

af ter the purchase of Marveon by YESCO 1 , on Januar y 5, 19 8 5", the
sign fell off the building and ki lied John Pickhover
6

1! f ter the lawsuit ensued, the defendant

:I = .fendant Young Electric Si gn Company apparently based upon i ts
cross-claim, aga :i nst a] 1 defendants (Adidendum Exhibit "F" pp. 4
S 5) an: I I based i IP :::)ii: l

. «.

. November

••"*".
..• : - . .^. „

entered

its Order and Judgmenv .! Marvec: *H Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(Addendum E>:h;;: • r.
8.

Th>

;

affirming the decision u: -.;;e t;r .i., court
(i addendum Exhibit "A.")
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ARGUMENT
YESCO respectfully asserts that this Court should
grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the
decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with prior
decisions of this Court. Also, the questions presented here
for review are important enough that they should be settled by
this Court; further, the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision which has sanctioned the departure by the trial court
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and
consequently requires this Court to exercise its power of
supervision.
First, the language of the Purchase Agreement between
Marveon and YESCO was not sufficient to require the defendant
Young Electric Sign Company to indemnify Marveon for its own
negligence.

This Court has consistently applied a strict

construction rule with respect to indemnification agreements as
has the Federal District Court for the District of Utah.
Second, indemnification is not the proper measure of
damages for a breach of contract.

The decision of the

appellate court is internally inconsistent in that it provides
that an agreement to purchase insurance does not make the party
agreeing to provide the insurance an indemnitor.

In fact, the

Court of Appeals was at great pains to point out in its Amended
Opinion that YESCO was liable for breach of contract for its
-6-

failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon; yet, it
affirms the decision of the trial court granting Marveon's
Motion for Summary Judgment which specifically states that
Marveon is entitled to indemnification to the extent of any
judgment entered against Marveon.

This is simply not the

proper measure of damages.
Finally, the appellant, YESC0, did not have a duty to
provide insurance to Marveon under the terms of the Purchase
Agreement.

YESC0 has argued from the beginning that its

promise to provide insurance was premised upon certain other
promises made by Marveon in the Purchase Agreement.
Specifically, Marveon promised that it had performed all of its
obligations required under contracts purchased and assumed by
YESCO.

YESCO argued before the Court of Appeals and before the

trial court that the Motion for Summary Judgment was premature
in that there were issues of fact to be determined by the jury
as to whether or not Marveon breached any of its contractual
obligations to Smith's prior to the sale of Marveon's assets to
YESCO.

YESCO asserted that if Marveon did breach its

obligations to Smith's, then YESCO would not be obligated to
purchase insurance for the benefit of Marveon.

Interestingly

enough, the jury answered in the affirmative the question of
whether or not Marveon breached its agreements under its
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maintenance contract with Smith's; the same maintenance
contract that YESCO purchased.
POINT I
THE LANGUAGE OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
MARVEON AND YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY TO INDEMNIFY MARVEON FOR ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE
The issue of whether or not an agreement to purchase
insurance is an indemnification agreement and the issue of
how those agreements should be construed are currently before
the Utah Supreme Court.

The decision of Judge Winder is

Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272 (D. Utah
1985), has been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit and apparently certified to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah for an advisory opinion as to the
interpretation of indemnification agreements and agreements to
purchase insurance, which under Freund were construed as
agreements to indemnify and thus strictly construed.

It is

obvious that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not
believe that this issue has been resolved adequately by the
Utah couirts and accordingly it would be appropriate if this
decision of the Court of Appeals likewise be determined by this
Court.
The language of Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthed 18
Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966) and Union Pacific R.R. Co. v

-8-

El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965)
in conjunction with the language in Freund, supra,
demonstrates that agreements to insure are essentially
agreements to indemnify and should thus be strictly construed.
This Court has applied a strict interpretation standard when
interpreting indemnity provisions similar to the one at hand.
The Court's standard in interpreting indemnity provisions
purporting to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence
is set forth in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965) as follows:
The majority rule appears to be that in
most situations, where such is the desire
of the parties, and it is clearly
understood and expressed, such a covenant
will be upheld. But the presumption is
against any such intention, and it is not
achieved by inference or implication from
general language such as employed here. It
will be regarded as a binding contractual
obligation only when the intention is
clearly and unequivocally expressed.
The general language used in the indemnity provision at hand
would not rebut the presumption against any intention by YESCO
to indemnify Marveon for its own negligence.

The Purchase

Agreement provided that YESCO would "provide, at its expense,
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon] against
. . . personal injury or death claims arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, use, service, transportation or
installation of displays in a minimum amount of one million
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dollars ($1,000,000.00)."

The Purchase Agreement goes on to

say that, "buyer [YESCO] assumes no liabilities or obligations
of seller [Marveon] unless as specifically described and set
forth herein."

(Purchase Agreement, Section 2.b. at p. 3,

Addendum Exhibit "E").

Clearly, this sort of language does not

seem to be sufficient to rebut the presumption of an intention
by YESCO to indemnify Marveon for Marveon's own negligence.
Certainly, YESCO did not "specifically describe" its intention
to indemnify Marveon for Marveon's own negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that language much
more specific than the language in the Purchase Agreement does
not constitute a clear and unequivocal expression of the
intentions of the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee's
negligent acts.

For example, in Howe Rents Corp. v.

Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 1966), the language "shall
be liable for all damages or loss of equipment regardless of
cause" was held not clear enough to support indemnification
when the indemnitee was negligent.

Marveon is attempting to

make an end run around this rule of law recognized in Utah by
arguing that this was a contract to insure and not a contract
of indemnification.
Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272, 278
(D. Utah 1985) appears to apply otherwise.

In that case, the

Court said, "[I]t is plain that unless the contract clearly and

-10-

unequivocally deals with the indemnitee's negligence, the
indemnitee will not be indemnified against its own
negligence.11

The Utah Supreme Court has never made a

determination of whether or not an agreement to insure which is
designed to provide indemnification should be construed
strictly as in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., supra, and Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, supra.
This is an issue for this Court to determine.

YESCO

respectfully asserts that the determination of the appellate
court is not in accord with existing Utah case law.
POINT II
INDEMNIFICATION IS NOT THE PROPER MEASURE
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
In the event that this Court were to agree with the
Court of Appeals1 Amended Decision, the language of the
decision is internally inconsistent and insufficient to resolve
the present problem.

In its decision, Pickhover v. Smith's

Management Corp., 106 Utah Adv. Rptr. 43 (April 11, 1989),
the Court states: [a]n agreement to purchase insurance does not
make the party agreeing to provide the insurance an
indemnitor."

M . at 45. The court goes on to say that it

reject[s] YESCOfs contention that the
strict construction rule applies to
agreements to purchase insurance for
another's benefit. We hold that the rule
applies only to indemnity provisions where
-11-

the indemnitee seeks indemnification for
the consequences of its own negligence.
If a party contractually agrees to
purchase insurance for another, the
agreement is to be construed under general
contract principles and, if the insurance
is not obtained, the party is liable for
breach of contract.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).

Yet, in spite of this language,

the court went on to affirm the decision of the trial court
which granted Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment on a theory
of indemnification.
In August of 1985, Marveon answered the plaintiffs'
Complaint in the underlying action and cross-claimed against
the other defendants, including YESCO.

(See Answer and

Cross-Claim, Addendum Exhibit "F.")
Paragraph 7 alleges "this defendant is entitled to be
fully indemnified by cross-defendants."

(Emphasis added.)

Nowhere in Marveon's cross-claim is there a reference or
allegation for breach of contract against YESCO.

In October of

1986, Marveon filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against
YESCO asserting that "Marveon is entitled to be indemnified
by Young Electric for the full amount of any such judgment up
to one million dollars . . . "

Subsequently, the trial court

granted Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment (see Order and
Judgment, Addendum, Exhibit "C") and stated as follows:

"NOW,

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: Judgment be,
and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon and against YESCO
-12-

that in the event a judgment is returned in favor of plaintiffs
and against Marveon that Marveon is entitled to be
indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of any such judgment
up to one million dollars, . . . "

(Emphasis added)

Essentially what has happened here is that the
Appeals Court has determined that there was a breach of
contract by YESCO by reason of its failure to purchase
insurance on behalf of Marveon.

The Court affirmatively states

that the Agreement is to be construed under general contract
principles and that if the insurance was not obtained, the
party that failed to purchase the insurance is liable for
breach of contract.

It is Hornbook Law that "as a general

rule, damages for breach of contract are limited to the
pecuniary loss sustained."
(1988).

22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 751

Nonetheless, the Court has allowed Marveon a judgment

for indemnification for any amount of judgment assigned to it
notwithstanding there has been no determination of Marveon's
pecuniary loss.

This anomalous result has occurred because the

Court of Appeals has analyzed this case from the point of view
of breach of contract whereas the parties in the dispute have
approached the case as one that should be determined under
rules of indemnification.

Consequently, it is not only

appropriate but important that this Court review the
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determination of the appellate court and grant YESCOfs
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
POINT III
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO
PROVIDE INSURANCE TO MARVEON UNDER THE TERMS OF
THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals
apparently addressed YESCOfs counter argument to the
Motion for Judgment of Marveon that in no event was YESCO
obligated to purchase insurance for Marveon because Marveon had
breached material provisions of the Purchase Agreement.
Specifically, YESCO argued to the trial court and to the Court
of Appeals that there were material issues of fact before the
court which should have precluded the court from granting
Marveon1s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Specifically, YESCO

argued that Marveon was in breach of its maintenance agreement
with Smith's Food King on the sign in question.

This

maintenance agreement was purchased by YESCO in 1981. YESCO
asserted vigorously that the failure to properly maintain the
sign prior to YESCO's purchase of the Marveon assets obviated
the necessity of YESCO to provide insurance naming Marveon.

In

other words, it was YESCO's assertion that Marveon's promise
that it had not breached any of its contracts, which were to be
purchased by YESCO, was material to YESCO's reciprocal
promise to purchase insurance for Marveon.
-14-

The jury verdict

specifically noted that Marveon was in breach of its
maintenance agreement with Smith's. As a consequence, YESC0
asserts that it had no obligation to purchase insurance on
behalf of Marveon and that the granting of Marveon's Motion for
Summary Judgment was inappropriate and premature as a matter of
law.

CONCLUSION
YESCO respectfully asserts that the issues presented
in this case, particularly with respect to the
interpretation of agreements to provide insurance and other
indemnification agreements, are important questions of state
law which have not been adequately settled, but should be, by
this Court.

Further, YESCO respectfully asserts that the

decision issued by the Court of Appeals is in conflict with
prior decisions of this Court and that the decision as rendered
calls for this Court's exercise of its power of supervision
over the Court of Appeals.

The Purchase Agreement between

Marveon and YESCO is essentially an agreement to indemnify.
Consequently, it should be interpreted pursuant to the rule of
strict interpretation currently in force in Utah.

Further, the

decision of the Appellate Court is internally inconsistent in
that it provides a measure of damages not congruent with its
determination that there was a breach of contract.

-15-

Finally, in

no event was YESCO required to purchase insurance for Marveon
because Marveon failed to live up to its contractual
obligations.

As a consequence, YESCO respectfully requests

that this Court grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
order to review the decision of the Court of Appeals entered
April 11, 1989.
DATED this

}&

day of June, 1989.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSQ1

Appe]
Electric Sic
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Company

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were hand delivered on this
of June, 1989, to the following counsel of record:

Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place - 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

PICK5/MMW
sm061289
6049-136
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corporation (A)

C O D E • CO
Provo, Utah

106 Utah Adv Rep>43

(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987).

Cite as

106 Utah Adv. Rep. 43

IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Toshiko PICKHOVER, an individual and
personal representative of the Estate of John
W. Pickhover; Catherine Pickhover, an
individual; and Gloria Pickhover, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
Smith's Food King Properties, a Utah
corporation; Dee's, Inc., a Utah corporation;
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah
corporation; and Image National, Inc., an
Idaho corporation,
Defendants and Appellant,
•.

Marveon Inc., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 880193-CA
FILED: April 11,1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS;
Michael S. Mohrman, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Robert H. Henderson, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and
Orme.
AMENDED OPINION
ORME, Judge:
This appeal involves a dispute between two
defendants in a wrongful death action, Young
Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") and
Marveon, Inc. YESCO appeals the trial
court's order holding YESCO responsible for
any judgment against Marveon in the wrongful death action. We affirm.
FACTS
YESCO and Marveon were competitors in
the commercial sign business until YESCO
purchased Marveon's assets in August of
1981. To effect this transaction, a written
purchase agreement was entered into by the
parties. Section 2(a) of the purchase agreement
provides that "[YESCO] agrees ... to provide,

43

at its expense, insurance coverage adequate to
fully protect [MarveonJ against property
damage ... or personal injury or death claims
arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
use, service, transportations [sic], or installation of [signs] in a minimum amount of One
Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)." YESCO
failed to provide such insurance coverage for
Marveon.
On January 5, 1985, John Pickhover was
killed when a sign at a Smith's Food King in
Sandy, Utah, fell and struck him. The sign
had been installed by Marveon in 1978. This
wrongful death action was subsequently
brought by Pickhover's widow against
YESCO, Marveon, and a number of other
defendants.
Marveon cross-claimed and immediately
moved for summary judgment against
YESCO. Citing section 2(a) of the purchase
agreement, Marveon argued that YESCO was
obligated to provide insurance coverage adequate to protect Marveon from any liability
arising from the installation of the sign, at
least to the extent of one million dollars.
Marveon sought a determination that YESCO
was liable, in the event that judgment be
entered against Marveon, because YESCO
failed to provide the insurance policy as required by the purchase agreement.
The trial court granted Marveon's motion
on.October 31, 1986, before any judgment had
been rendered in the underlying wrongful
death action.1 The trial court ruled that
Marveon was entitled to indemnification by
YESCO for up to one million dollars, the
amount specified in the purchase agreement.
YESCO challenges the trial court's ruling
and raises only one issue on appeal: Does
section 2(a) of the purchase agreement require
YESCO to provide an insurance policy covering the financial consequences of Marveon's
own negligence?2 YESCO argues that, under
Utah law, an indemnity contract purportedly
requiring one party to assume responsibility
for the financial consequences of another's
negligence must be strictly construed against
such coverage absent clear and unequivocal
language. Furthermore, YESCO claims that an
agreement to provide insurance for the benefit
of another, such as the agreement contained in
section 2(a) of the purchase agreement, is
analogous to an indemnity agreement and,
therefore, the same standard of strict interpretation is applicable. Accordingly, YESCO
asserts that because the purchase agreement
does not expressly provide that the insurance
coverage to be furnished will cover Marveon's
own negligence, YESCO is not liable to
Marveon because any judgment against
Marveon in the underlying wrongful death
action would necessarily be based on
Marveon's own negligence.
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The Court, upon finding the defendant, Arden M. Barlow, in contempt,
sentenced him to be confined and
imprisoned in the Kane County Jail
for ten (10) days, to run concurrently
with the jail term imposed for the
offense of Written False Statement,
and fined the sum of Three Hundred
Dollars ($300.00)/
No order appears in the record reciting the facts
forming the basis for the finding of contempt.
Thus, through no fault of appellant, appellate
review of the contempt finding is not possible. In
addition, Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10 (1987)
limits the maximum fine that may be imposed on
a contempt judgement of $200.
The portion of the judgment sentencing appellant for contempt is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for entry of appropriate findings and a judgment consistent with this
decision. The remainder of the judgment, sentence, and commitment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:
This appeal involves a dispute between two
defendants in a wrongful death action, Young
Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") and Marveon,
Inc. YESCO appeals the trial court's order
holding YESCO responsible for any judgment
against Marveon in the wrongful death action.
We affirm the trial court's basic disposition of
the liability issue but remand for further proceedings to establish the appropnate damages.
FACTS
YESCO and Marveon were competitors in the
commercial sign business until YESCO purchased
Marveon's assets in August of 1981. To effect
this transaction, a written purchase agreement was
entered into by the parties. Section 2(a) of the
purchase agreement provides that "[YESCO]
agrees ... to provide, at its expense, insurance
coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon]
against property damage ... or personal injury or
death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, transportations [sic], or
installation of [signs] in a minimum amount of
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)/ YESCO
failed to provide such insurance coverage for
Marveon.
On January 5, 1985, John Pickhover was killed
when a sign at a Smith's Food King in Sandy,
Utah, fell and struck him. The sign had been
installed by Marveon in 1978. This wrongful
death action was subsequently brought by Pickhover's widow against YESCO, Marveon, and a
number of other defendants.
Marveon cross-claimed and immediately
moved for summary judgment against YESCO.
Citing section 2(a) of the purchase agreement,
Marveon argued that YESCO was obligated to
provide insurance coverage adequate to protect
Marveon from any liability arising from the installation of the sign, at least to the extent of one
million dollars. Marveon sought a determination
that YESCO was liable, in the event that judgment be entered against Marveon, because
YESCO failed to provide the insurance policy as
required by the purchase agreement.
The trial court granted Marveon's motion on
October 31, 1986, before any judgment had been
rendered in the underlying wrongful death action.1
.The trial court ruled that Marveon was entitled
to indemnification by YESCO for up to one
million dollars, the amount specified in the pur*
chase agreement.
YESCO challenges the trial court's ruling and
raises only one issue on appeal: Does section 2(a)
of the purchase agreement require YESCO to
provide an insurance policy covering the financial
consequences of Marveon's own negligence?2
YESCO argues that, under Utah law, an indemnity contract purportedly requiring one party to
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assume responsibility for the financial conseque- 1
nces of another's negligence must be strictly
construed against such coverage absent clear and
unequivocal language. Furthermore, YESCO
claims that an agreement to provide insurance for
the benefit of another, such as the agreement
contained in section 2(a) of the purchase agreement, is analogous to an indemnity agreement
and, therefore, the same standard of strict inter- I
pretation is applicable. Accordingly, YESCO
asserts that because the purchase agreement does
not expressly provide that the insurance coverage
to be furnished will cover Marveon's own negligence, YESCO is not liable to Marveon because
any judgment against Marveon in the underlying
wrongful death action would necessarily be based
on Marveon's own negligence.
I
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
YESCO is correct in asserting that Utah courts
apply the rule of strict construction when confronted with an indemnity agreement and the claim
that, through such an agreement, one party has
shifted financial responsibility for its own negligence onto the other party. See, e.g., Shell Oil
Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.t 658 P.2d
1187, 1189 (Utah 1983); Union Pac R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n* 568 P.2d 724, 72526 (Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen,
18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966); Union
Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah
2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (1965). Sec also
Bamis v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d
207, 208 (1965). The strict construction rule seems
to have arisen primarily to appease the concern
that one who is not financially responsible for the
consequences of his or her own negligence will be
less careful in his or her behavior toward others. See,
e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 913. Under the strict construction rule, a party is contractually obligated to
assume ultimate financial responsibility for the
negligence of another "only when that intention is I
clearly and unequivocally expressed/ Id. at 914.
'But the presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by inference or implication from general language — "Id.

_
Jl

cases. See Union Pacific Railroad, 568
P.2d at 725, and cases cited therein. It
is clear from reading the Utah cases
that Utah looks to the purpose of the
agreement. If the purpose is to insure
[another] against its own acts, that
constitutes an indemnification agreement, and the presumptions against it
prevail in the absence of a clearly
expressed contrary intent.
730 F.2d at 1382. However, Kennecott Copper
misconstrues Utah law.
The Utah cases referred to by the Tenth Circuit
in Kennecott Copper do not support its conclusion that contracts to provide insurance are
subject to the strict construction rule. Those cases
involve classic indemnity provisions and make no
attempt to analogize such provisions to an agreement to provide insurance. See, e.g., Union Pac.
R.R. v. Intennountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d
at 725; Howe Rents Corp., 420 P.2d at 849; Barrus,
398 P.2d at 208. We are not cited to any
Utah case actually supporting the position endorsed in Kennecott Copper and Freund. Our own
Iresearch has not revealed such a case. The issue
appears to be one of first impression for the
appellate courts of this state.
We are convinced that an agreement to provide
insurance for another's benefit, while analogous
in some respects to an agreement, to indemnify
another for the consequences of its own negligence, is not subject to the strict construction rule.
Our conclusion is prompted by the emerging trend
to limit application of the strict construction rule,
analysis of the function served by an agreement to
provide insurance, and well-reasoned cases from
other jurisdictions.

TREND TO LIMIT RULE
It appears that the contemporary judicial trend is
to limit the application of the strict construction
rule. Especially given the judicial history df the
rule in Utah, we believe the law of Utah should
develop consistent with this trend.
Early on, the Utah Supreme Court stated "[i]t
is very doubtful that defendant could relieve itself
by contract from its own negligence. Ordinarily,
such contracts are contrary to public policy." Jankele
RECENT FEDERAL CASES
YESCO is also correct in asserting that the federal v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425,
courts, endeavoring to apply Utah law, have held 427 (1936). A generation later, the Court moderthat *(a] requirement to provide insurance is ated its view and was able to hold that indemnity
governed by the same rule of [strict] construction contracts, even where they are for the purpose of
as an indemnification provision which seeks ind- providing relief from one's own negligence, are
emnification for the indemnitee's own neglig- valid if they pass muster under the strict constrence/ Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 625 F. uction rule. See, e.g., Walker Bank St Trust Co.
v. First Sec. Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944,
Supp. 272, 280 (D. Utah 1985) (citing Kennecott
947 (1959). This change in Utah judicial attitude
Copper Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 730 F.2d
may well have been prompted by the position
1380 (10th Cir. 1984)). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit
adopted by the majority of jurisdictions upholaddressed the precise issue in Kennecott Copper
ding indemnity provisions, which was no doubt
and held that:
attributable to the ever-increasing use of liability
[Defendant] has tried to distinguish
insurance. See Manson-Osbcrg Co. v. Alaska,
the indemnification cases by arguing
552 P.2d 654, 659 (Alaska 1976). Courts recognthat there is a difference between an
ized that many insurance contracts effectively
agreement to purchase insurance to
shift the financial burden for the insured's own
cover [another's] own acts and an
negligence onto the insurer. Accordingly, it would
indemnification agreement. There is
make little sense to altogether prohibit indemnity
no support for that position in Utah
agreements intended to do the same, on public
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policy grounds, while embracing their insurance to purchase insurance does not make the party
agreement cousins.
agreeing to provide the insurance an indemnitor.
Nowr coming full circle, courts are beginning to Rather,
change their view of the strict construction rule.
an agreement to insure is an agreement
At least one jurisdiction has all but abandoned
to provide both parties with the benthe rule. See C.J.M. Constr. Inc. v. Chandler
efits of insurance. Individuals underPlumbing & Heating, Inc., 708 P.2d 60, 64
stand that insurance will protect them
(Alaska 1985) ('It is no longer necessary under
against the consequences of their own
Alaska law that an indemmty clause contain
negligence and more than likely
words specifying indemmty for the indemnitee's
assume that if one ... agrees as part of
own negligence."); Manson-Osberg Co. v.
his or its [contractual] duties to
Alaska, 552 P.2d 654, 659 (Alaska 1976) ("In
provide insurance, that the insurance
modern commerce, indemnity clauses are no
will protect both of them regardless of
longer so unusual as to require such specific
the cause of the loss.... If that were
mention of the indemnitee's conduct as being
not their intent, each would provide
within the scope of the indemnifying obligahis or its own protection....
tion."). Other courts have moderated their appliSouth Tippecanoe School Bldg. v. Shambaugh &
cation of the rule. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Davis
Corp., 219 Kan. 148, 547 P.2d 800, 808 (1976) Son, Inc., 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320,
("Although recognizing the [strict construction] 327 (1979) (quoting Morsches Lumber v. Probst,
rule, a great majority of courts hold that it is not 180 Ind. App. 202, 388 N.E.2d 284, 286-87
necessary that the agreement contain specific or (1979)).
express language covering the [indemnitee's]
negligence, if the intention to afford such protection clearly appears from the contract, the surr- I
ounding circumstances and the purposes and ]
objects of the parties."); Simons v. Tri-State
Constr. Co., 33 Wash. App. 315, 655 P.2d 703,
708 (1982) (clauses purporting to indemnify a
party for its, own negligence are to be strictly
construed against such coverage, but the clause
must be viewed realistically to recognize the intent
of the parties to allocate the cost or expense of
certain risks among themselves). Even if we were
more enamored of the strict construction rule, we
would be reluctant to expand the rule's application to agreements to provide insurance while
other jurisdictions are restricting its application.
FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Two aspects of the typical agreement to provide
insurance support our conclusion. First, a contractual entitlement to insurance provided by
another does not encourage the beneficiary of
that agreement to act any more irresponsibly than
the insurance policy itself would. Of course, Utah
cases have not applied the indemnity-type strict
construction rule to actual insurance policies.3 In
our view, it would be irrational and inconsistent
to apply the rule to agreements to provide insurance simply because the insured has negotiated
with a third party to pay the insurance premium.
An agreement to provide insurance merely allocates an economic burden on one party to make a
payment to protect another after the parties have
ultimately decided "to shift the risk of loss ...
upon an insurer." Steamboat Dev. Corp. v.
Bacjac Indus., 701 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo. App.
1985). Thus, we think an agreement to provide
insurance is more analogous to an insurance
contract, to which the strict construction rule does
not apply, than to an indemnity agreement.
Second, our conclusion advances the bargainedfor expectations of the parties. It is commonly
understood that insurance of the type contemplated in the purchase agreement is purchased to
protect the named insured from the financial
consequences of its own negligence. An agreement

SUPPORTIVE CASE LAW
Our conclusion is also supported by recent cases
from other jurisdictions. These decisions treat an
agreement to provide insurance as a matter of
simple contract and not as a matter of indemnity.
See, e.g., Steamboat Dev. Corp., 701 P.2d at 128;
Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Ashland-Warren,
Inc., 458 So.2d 851, 855-56 (Fla. App. 1984), cert,
denied, 464 So.2d 554 (Ha. 1985); Hooks v.
Southeast Constr. Corp., 538 F.2d 431, 433 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. L.K.
Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. Nev.
1980); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. H.C. Price
Co., 694'P.2d 782, 785-86 (Alaska 1985); Ramsey v.
Marutamaya
Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72
Cal.App.3d 516, 140 Cal.Rptr. 247, 258 (1977)*
Two of these cases are particularly compelling
and merit further discussion.
In Cone Bros. Contracting, the parties had
contractually agreed that a subcontractor would
indemnify the contractor. The subcontractor also
agreed to purchase an insurance policy naming
the contractor as an insured party. As in this
case, the insurance policy was not obtained. After
a personal injury action was brought against the
contractor, it sued the subcontractor. The trial
court dismissed the contractor's claim based on
the indemnification clause, but entered judgment
against the subcontractor for breaching the agreement to purchase insurance for the contractor.
458 So.2d at 854. The subcontractor appealed and
argued that the agreement to provide insurance
did not 1) expressly provide that the contractor
was to be protected from liability for its own
negligence or 2) comply with a Florida statute
requiring certain terms to be included in a contract purporting to indemnify one for its own
negligence. Id*
The Florida Court of Appeals rejected both
arguments and upheld the trial court's imposition
of liability on the subcontractor for breaching the
agreement to purchase insurance. Id. at 855-56.
In affirming, the court distinguished the indemnity clause from the contractual obligation to
provide insurance. The court held that while the
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contractor's claim based on the indemmty provision was properly dismissed pursuant to the strict
construction rule, there was no merit in the subcontractor's contention that the claim for breach
of the agreement to provide insurance must likewise be dismissed. Further distinguishing the two
claims, the court held that the Florida statute "is
clearly a limitation upon indemnification and has
no applicability to a contract provision relating to
insurance...." Id. at 856.
In Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. Bacjac Indus., 701
P.2d 127 (Colo. App. 1985), a property owner
agreed to provide an insurance policy in favor of
a contractor working on the owner's property.
The agreement stated only that the "insurance
shall include the interest of the ... contractor." Id.
at 128. The agreement did not expressly provide
that the insurance would protect the contractor
from the financial consequences of its own negligence. Nonetheless, the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
owner could not recover damages arising from the
contractor's alleged negligence as the owner had
'breached the contract by failing to obtain all risk
insurance in favor of the contractor,' id., which
would have covered the owner's claim.

„
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burden to purchase the insurance on YESCO as
part of the consideration for Marveon's assets.
YESCO breached its agreement and is liable to
Marveon for that breach.
However, we are convinced that this case must
be remanded for consideration of the compensable damages Marveon suffered as a result of
YESCO'S breach. In an action for breach of a
contract to provide insurance, the measure of
general damages, at least in cases like the instant
one, is the amount the policy would have paid
had it been obtained. See, e.g., PPG Indust. v.
Continental Heller Corp., 124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d
108, 113-114 (1979) (where insurance contracted
for would have provided primary coverage,
damages included full amount paid by contracting
party's own insurer).
Under the facts of this case, the calculation of
damages is somewhat problematic. Marveon had
sufficient insurance coverage for the Pickhover
claim under the terms of a policy in effect at the
time the Smith's sign was installed by Marveon.
In a sense, then, Marveon itself was not damaged
by YESCO's breach. However, Marveon's
insurer stands in Marveon's shoes. See Utah
Code Ann. §31A-21-108 (1986). See also PPG
Indust., 603 P.2d at 114. Marveon's insurer is
damaged to the extent it had to pay a 'claim it
would not have had to pay, at least in full, but
for YESCO's breach. Because both Marveon's
own insurance policy and the policy YESCO was
obligated to provide Marveon would provide
potential coverage for the claim in question, the
recoverable damages in this case are the amount
which would have been paid under the YESCO
policy had it been provided. On remand, the
court must determine an appropriate allocation
between the two policies, with reference to the
terms of Marveon's actual policy and the prob' able terms of the policy YESCO should have
furnished. Of prime importance is the primary,
secondary, or concurrent nature of the two policies. No doubt expert testimony from insurance
brokers, underwriters, and the like, coupled with
the wide use of standardized, preprinted policy
provisions, will allow the court to reconstruct
with some accuracy the terms of the policy
YESCO agreed to provide.
The parties shall bear their own costs of this
appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reject YESCO's
contention that the strict construction rule applies
to agreements to purchase insurance for another's
benefit. We hold that the rule applies only to
indemnity provisions where the indemnitee seeks
indemnification for the consequences of its own
negligence. If a party contractually agrees to
purchase insurance for another, the agreement is
to be construed under general contract principles4
and, if the insurance is not obtained, the party is
liable for breach of contract.
Applying this analysis to section 2(a) of the
purchase agreement, it is clear that both YESCO
and Marveon believed, understood, and contractually agreed that YESCO would provide insurance coverage to protect Marveon from all pertinent claims, including those resulting from its
own negligence. The provision is couched in
broad terms: YESCO will "provide, at its
expense, insurance coverage adequate to fully
protect [Marveon] against property damage ... or
personal injury or death claims arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, use, service, transportGregory K. Orme, Judge
ations [sic], or installation of [signs] in a
minimum amount of One Million Dollars | WE CONCUR:
($1,000,000.00)." YESCO is able to suggest no set
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
of circumstances where that provision would be
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
of any real benefit to Marveon if the policy did
not cover Marveon in a case like the instant one. Cf.
1. Eventually, Mrs. Pickhover's wrongful death
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mec- action was successful. Relief m her favor included a
hanical Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556, 566 judgment against Marveon based on its negligent
(1965) ("It cannot be assumed that in negotiations
installation of the Smith's Food King sign that
for a contract a party knowingly asks for sometkilled her husband.
hing which would be of no value to him.").
2. Marveon also challenges this court's jurisdiction.
Marveon sold its assets to YESCO and left the After entenng judgment m Marveon's favor and
against YESCO, the trial court certified its judgment
sign business. As part of the arrangement,
as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). YESCO
Marveon desired insurance protection of the most
filed its appeal based on this certification. Marveon
comprehensive sort, including, to the extent posclaims the trial court erred in certifying its order
sible, for past acts of negligence not yet manifeunder Rule 54(b) because it did not wholly dispose
sted. Section 2(a) merely placed the economic
of Marveon's claim against YESCO. However,
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Marveon previously moved for dismissal on this
very ground. That motion was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court before the case was transferred to
this court. We are not inclined to disturb the
Supreme Court's disposition of this issue and reject
Marveon's jurisdictional challenge. See Condcr v.
A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
a . App. 1987).
3. On the contrary, the "strict construction" rule
that is employed in connection with insurance policies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g.. Fuller v.
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
1985) ("An insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be
provided by the policy."); Williams v. First Colony
Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co.,
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an
insured). See also Colard v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence,
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are
construed to accomplish the object of providing
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89,
91 (1985) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court
must construe the policy so as to sustain indemnity.").
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit language clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the
question of whether such coverage was intended.
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather
than by invoking the strict construction rule. See'
generally Wilbum v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
The State of Utah filed an interlocutory appeal
challenging the district court's suppression of
cocaine seized after a Utah Highway trooper
stopped Jose Francisco Arroyo ("Arroyo1') for an
alleged traffic violation. The trial court fo>ind the
stop of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which
violated Arroyo's fourth amendment rights. We
reverse.
FACTS
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15,
1987, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson ("Trooper Mangelson") was driving home
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper
Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near
Nephi, Utah, when he observed a northbound
truck-camper following the car in front of it too
closely. Trooper Mangelson made a U-turn
through the median and caught up with Arroyo's
truck.
Trooper Mangelson observed that the truck was
following the vehicle in from of him at a distance
of three to eight car lengths at a speed of approximately fifty miles per hour. Trooper Mangelson
pulled alongside the truck in order to observe its
occupants and estimate the truck's speed.
Trooper Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his
passenger were Hispanic, and he stopped the
truck.
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "following too
closely" and for driving on an expired driver's
license. Trooper Mangelson then asked Arroyo if
he could search his truck, and Arroyo agreed.
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel.
Trooper Mangelson then arrested Arroyo for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837-8(l)(a)(i) (1986), a second degree felony.
Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine claiming
Trooper Mangelson's traffic stop was a pretext to
search his truck for evidence of a more serious
crime. The trial court found no traffic violation
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangelson's
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to investigate a vehicle he found suspicious because of outof-state license plates and Hispanic occupants.
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the
subsequent search of his truck, but nevertheless,
granted the motion to suppress. The State
appeals.
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial
court erred in ruling that Trooper Mangelson's
stop of Arroyo for "following too closely" was a
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo's subsequent consent to the search of his truck purged the
taint of the otherwise unconstitutional stop.1
The trial court's factual evaluation underlying
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous,
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, et al.f
Defendants.

Civil No.

C85-4307

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendant, Marveon, Inc.'s (Marveon) Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Defendant Young Electric Sign Company (YESCO)
came on regularly for Hearing before The Honorable Scott Daniels
at the Law and Motion calendar at 10:00 a.m. on October 31, 1986.
Each party was represented by counsel.

The Court heard the

arguments of Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen
& Martineau on behalf of Marveon and Michael K. Mohrman of the
law firm Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson on behalf of YESCO.
The Court fully reviewed the Memoranda on file and the Court
was fully advised.

^

"fc .

The Court concludes that in the event any judgment is
returned in -favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon, that
Marveon is entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full
amount of any such judgment up to $1,000,000 and that YESCO
be required to pay Marveon's costs and attorneys1 fees from
and after the date of the tender of the defense of Marveon
to YESCO.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
That Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment Against
YESCO be, and hereby is granted.
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED THAT:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon
and against YESCO that in the event any judgment is returned
in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon that Marveon is
entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of
any such judgment up to $1,000,000, and that YESCO pay Marveon's
costs and attorneys' fees from and after the date of the tender
of defense of Marveon to YESCO.
DATED this

day of November, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

£QUCLI

i

Ixll

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge

ATTEST
-2-

H. DtXCH HWCLEY

^r\ "•

EXHIBIT "D"

272

625 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

ment. Such a promise is alone not enough
to establish a claim, but when coupled with
an employee's reliance, it is sufficient to
raise triable issues of fact.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Counts I, II
and III of Abel's complaint are hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Donald J. FREUND, Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah corporation; and Cablemain, Inc., a Texas
corporation; Jones Intercable, Inc., a
Colorado corporation; Cable TV Fund
VIII-B, a Colorado partnership, and
John Doe 1 through John Doe 25, Inclusive, Defendants.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, and Cablemain, Inc.,
a Texas corporation, Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
JONES INTERCABLE, INC., CP National
Corporation, Cable TV Fund VIII-B,
Konocti TV, Inc., and Alexander and
Alexander, Third-Party Defendants.
Argonaut Insurance Company, Plaintiff
in Intervention.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
CP NATIONAL CORP., et al.,
Defendants.
Civ. Nos. C-82-0747W, C-84-0400W.
United States District Court,
D. Utah, CD.
Nov. 25, 1985.
Cable television company worker
brought action against electric utility and

company which had previously hung cable
on utility pole for injuries sustained when
he came in contact wih electrical power line
while splicing amplifiers into cable. Company which had hung cable and electric
utility asserted claims against cable television company. The District Court, Winder, J., held that: (1) cable television company was employer of worker under Utah
workmen's compensation law; (2) under
Utah law, company which had hung cable
was not entitled to assert common-law indemnity claim against cable television company; (3) facilities attachment agreement
did not require cable television company to
indemnify electric utility for utility's own
negligence; and (4) facilities attachment
agreement provision requiring cable television company to provide liability insurance for electric utility did not require liability insurance for utility's own negligent
acts.
Summary judgment granted for cable
television company.

1. Workers' Compensation e=»187
For purposes of Utah workmen's compensation Act [U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60] granting excjusive remedy, cable television company, its subsidiary and its limited partner
were employers of worker who sustained
injury while working on system of limited
partnership, where cable television company, as part of its management style,
grouped all employees together under its
direct control, rather than having subsidiary or limited partner hire individually, and
where worker's payroll checks and time
sheets were handled by cable television
company.
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>2142
Under Utah law, agreement or promise
of cable television company to indemnify
company which hung cable could not be
implied to avoid exclusive remedy provision
of Utah Workmen's Compensation Act
[U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60] in action by employ-
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ee of cable television company for injuries
sustained when he came into contact with
electrical power line while splicing amplifiers into cable.
3. Indemnity <8=>8.1(1)
In determining whether indemnity provision expressed clear and unequivocal intention of indemnitor to indemnify indemnitee from losses attributable to indemnity's
own negligence, court must be guided by
presumption against such intention and
understanding that indemnity agreements
are strictly construed against indemnitee.
4. Indemnity <^8.1(2)
Facilities attachment agreement providing that cable television company would
indemnify electric utility for liability arising out of erection, maintenance, presence,
use, or removal of cable television company's equipment was not sufficiently explicit, under Utah law, to require cable television company to indemnify electric utility
for liability arising out of negligence of
electric utility, absent express reference to
obligation to indemnify for electric utility's
negligence, even though another portion of
such agreement provided that cable television company would indemnify electric
utility from claim or other liabilities arising
from interruption of electric utility service.
5. Workers' Compensation <§=>2142
Absent clearly expressed intention to
contract away cable television company's
immunity or reference to cable television
company's obligation to indemnify electric
company for injuries caused to cable television company's employees, facilities attachment agreement providing that cable
television company would indemnify electric utility for liability arising out of erection, maintenance, presence, and use, or
removal of cable television company's
equipment was insufficient to overcome
presumption that cable television company
did not contract away employer immunity
under Utah Workmen's Compensation Act
[U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60]
6. Insurance G=»l 46.5(1)
Under Utah law, intention of parties
regarding insurance coverage must be

clearly and unequivocally expressed where
action on insurance agreements sounds as
action for indemnification.
7. Indemnity <s=*8.1(l)
Insurance <S=>433(1)
There is presumption against insuring
one's self against one's own acts in construing agreement to purchase insurance
to cover lessor's own acts or indemnification provision which seeks indemnification
for indemnitee's own negligence.
8. Insurance <$=>104(3)
Insurance provision of facilities attachment agreement requiring cable television
company to provide liability policy covering
electric utility with respect to all liabilities
arising out of agreement allowing cable
television company to attach cables to utility poles did not require cable television
company to provide liability policy for electric utility's own negligence, absent explicit
provision stating that coverage must be
provided to cover utility's own negligent
acts.

Ralph W. Bastian, Jr., San Francisco,
Cal., Jackson Howard, D. David Lambert,
Provo, Utah, for Donald J. Freund.
Stephen B. Nebeker, Anthony B. Quinn,
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Robert Gordon,
David A. Westerby, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Utah Power & Light Co.
Scott W. Christensen, Salt Lake City,
Utah, for Home Ins. Co.
Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Cablemain, Inc.
Glenn C. Hanni, Paul M. Belnap, Gary A.
Dodge, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Jones
Intercable, Cable Fund and Konocti.
Robert A. Aune, San Francisco, Cal., for
Argonaut Ins.
Robert W. Brandt, Robert G. Gilchrist,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for CP Nat.
Donald J. Purser, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Fireman's Fund.
Dale J. Lambert, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Alexander & Alexander.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

WINDER, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on opposing motions for summary judgment filed by
Utah Power and Light, Jones Intercable,
Inc., et al, and by CP National. In addition, a motion to dismiss was filed by defendant Home Insurance Company. Oral
argument was made to the court on October 18, 1985. D. David Lambert, Ralph W.
Bastian, Jr. and Robert E. Aune were
present on behalf of plaintiff Freund. Robert W. Brandt and Michael P. Zaccheo appeared on behalf of defendant C.P. National. Glenn C. Hanni and Mark Taylor were
present representing Jones Intercable, Konocti TV, Inc. and Cable TV Fund VIII-B.
Stephen B. Nebeker, Anthony B. Quinn,
Jeffery Eisenberg and David Westerby appeared on behalf of Utah Power and Light.
Allan L. Larson and Jerry D. Fenn appeared on behalf of Cablemain Inc., while
Scott W. Christensen appeared on behalf of
Home Insurance. Gary Dodge was present
representing Jones Intercable and Dale
Lambert appeared on behalf of Alexander
and Alexander. The court took the motions under advisement and has read carefully the various memoranda filed by the
parties as well as pertinent sources cited
therein. Being fully advised, the court
now renders the following decision and order.
Factual Background
This lawsuit arises out of an accident on
October 11, 1981, in which the plaintiff,
Donald R. Freund, was injured when he
came in contact with an electrical power
line. When injured, Freund was splicing
amplifiers into cable previously h\mg by
Cablemain on utility poles owned by Utah
Power & Light. Freund was working at
the time of the accident for Jones and Fund
VIII-B in the construction of a cable TV
system in Washington City, Utah.
Mr. Freund has brought suit against Cablemain and Utah Power & Light. Utah
Power and Light, in turn, has asserted
claims against Jones Intercable based upon

a written agreement between the parties
known as the Facilities Attachment Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "FAA").
The FAA was originally negotiated between the predecessors-in-interest of Utah
Power & Light and Jones Intercable, CP
National and Summit Communications, respectively. Under the terms of the FAA,
the cable TV companies may attach cables
to utility poles provided they agree to indemnify the utility company for injuries
which result from their activities and obtain liability insurance for the utility's benefit.
The present motions raise a number of
issues. Cablemain's motion for summary
judgment involves the issue of whether
Jones, Fund VIII-B and Konocti were employers of Freund within the meaning of
the Utah workmen's compensation laws
and whether they may be liable to Cablemain based on the theory o! implied common law indemnity. Both Utah Power &
Light and CP National in their motions
claim that under the terms of the FAA
they are entitled to complete indemnity
from Jones with respect to Fruend's personal injury claim. Utah Power & Light, in
the alternative, claims that if it is found
liable, it is entitled to recover an amount up
to $500,000 based on Jones' alleged breach
of the FAA agreement to provide liability
insurance. Jones, in its motion, seeks a
determination that it was the employer of
Freund and as such is not liable to any
party in the suit based on claims arising
from either implied or express indemnity
provisions. It maintains that workmen's
compensation is the exclusive remedy here.
After reviewing the record, and listening to
the arguments, the court finds that there
are no genuine issues of material fact so as
to preclude the granting of summary judgment pursuant to Fed.Rule Civ.Pro. 56.
Jones, Cable VIII-B and Konocti as
Statutory Employers
[1] Cablemain contends that the record
reveals a factual question regarding
Freund's employer at the time of the accident. Cablemain asserts that it is possible
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that Freund was employed by Konocti as
opposed to Jones. The contradictory testimony of Ronald Schmitt in his two depositions provides the basis for Cablemain's
argument.
The court after reviewing the record,
however, finds the facts regarding
Freund's employments are clear. Jones is
a Colorado corporation, qualified to do business in Utah. Fund VIII-B is a limited
partnership, whose general and managing
partner is Jones. Konocti is a California
corporation and a subsidiary of Jones. The
record shows that Jones, as part of its
management style, groups all its employees together in one system under its direct
control rather than having its subsidiary or
limited partner hire individually. Because
of this organizational style, Jones moves its
experienced employees from one system to
another to perform technical tasks associated with the cable TV business. Cable Fund
VIII-B and Konocti have no employees but
reimburse Jones for the use of its employees. In the present case, Freund worked
at the Konocti location but was transferred
by the Jones' management team to St.
George to install components along the
newly strung Fund VIII-B system cable.

elusive remedy provisions of the workmen's compensation law.
Implied Indemnity
12] Cablemain urges the court to find
that an implied agreement to indemnify
exists between Jones and Cablemain. Cablemain contends that Jones or Cable Fund
VIII-B directed Cablemain to install the
cable and assured Cablemain that various
problems relating to the cables' proximity
to the powerline would be rectified promptly. Those assurances and directions form
the basis for Cablemain's implied indemnity
claim.

The facts reveal that Freund was employed by and controlled by Jones during
the time relevant to this action. That is
evidenced among other things by the payroll checks and time sheets.1 It is also
clear that Freund was working on the Fund
VIII system at the time he was injured.
There is no evidence that Konocti was in
any way involved in the circumstances giving rise to this law suit. In the alternative,
if Konocti was involved, it was as Freund's
employer. Utah law recognizes that there
may be multiple employers of an employee
and all may be entitled to the workmen's
compensation defense. Bambrough v.
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The
court finds that Jones, Fund VIII-B and
Konocti are statutory employers of Freund
and are therefore entitled to claim the ex-

The Utah Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on whether an agreement or promise
to indemnify might be implied in certain
circumstances thereby avoiding the exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. See Shell Oil Company v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Company, 658 P.2d 1187, 1191 n. 3 (Utah 1983).
Cablemain argues that the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals applying Utah law in
Barr v. Brezina Construction Co., 464
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.1972) cert denied, Brezina Construction Co. v. U.S., 409 U.S.
1125, 93 S.Ct. 937, 35 L.Ed.2d 256 (1973),
suggested that an implied promise to indemnify could have been found in that case
under different facts.
At this point in time, however, the Utah
Supreme Court has not concluded that an
implied indemnity agreement may exist in
spite of the exclusiveness of Workmen's
Compensation. Until the State court rules
conclusively on this issue, this court will
not second guess its conclusion. Cf. Bertoch v. Marriott Corporation, No. C826029 (Dist.Ct, Utah, March 13, 1984).
Moreover, the Utah court has considered
and rejected any constitutional challenge to
the exclusive remedy provision. Morrill v.
J&M Construction Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah
1981). Cablemain's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of common law indemnity is therefore denied.

1. Because of the undisputed evidence regarding
the organizational relationship between Jones,
Fund VIII-B, and Konocti, and the manner in

which employees were managed by Jones, the
court concludes that Jones was also the employer of Bond and Schmitt.
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Agreement

[3] CP National, Utah Power & Light
and Cablemain claim Jones, Fund VIII-B,
and Konocti breached the terms of the Facilities Attachment Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as "FAA"). They premise their
claims on the assertion that the Jones companies ("Jones'') assumed the FAA obligations of Summit Communications to CP
National and its assignee, Utah Power &
Light. Jones has asserted that it did not
assume the obligations of the FAA when it
entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Summit Communications.
For purposes of this motion only and in
order to decide the legal significance of
various controverted portions of the FAA,
the court will ignore the factual issue and
will assume that the FAA is enforceable
between Utah Power & Light and Jones.
Indemnification for Utah Power &
LighVs Own Negligence
Assuming that Jones and Fund VIII-B
have undertaken the obligations of the
FAA, the court must determine first,
whether those obligations require Jones to
indemnify Utah Power & Light for Utah
Power & Light's negligence. Second, the
court must determine whether the FAA
would require Jones to reimburse Utah
Power & Light based on Jones' alleged
failure to provide Utah Power & Light with
liability insurance.
As mentioned previously, the FAA governed use of CP National's utility poles by
Summit Communications. Paragraphs 20
and 21 are indemnity provisions whose legal significance is in dispute. Those paragraphs state:
20. The Licensee shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless the Licensor
from any cause of action, claim, or other
legal proceeding by the Licensee's subscribers or other third persons against
the Licensor in the event the continued
use of poles owned by the Licensor is
denied to Licensee for any reason. In
addition the Licensee shall, upon demand
and at its own risk and expense, defend

any and all such actions, claims, or other
legal proceedings.
21. Licensee shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless Licensor from
and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, costs or other
liabilities for damages to property and
injury or death to persons which may
arise out of or be connected vrith the
erection, maintenance, presence, use or
removal of Licensee's equipment, or of
structures, guys and anchors, used, installed or placed for the principal purpose of supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act of Licensee on or in
the vicinity of Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of limitation, payments made under workmen's compensation laws. Except for intentional
wrongdoing or willful negligence on the
part of Licensor, or any of its agents or
employees, Licensee shall also indemnify
protect and save harmless Licensor from
and against any and all claims, demands,
causes of action, costs, or other liabilities
arising from any interruption, discontinuance or interference with Licensee's
service which may be occasioned or
which may be claimed to have been occasioned by any action of Licensor pursuant to or consistent with this agreement.
In addition, Licensee shall, upon demand
and at its own sole risk and expense,
defend any and all suits, actions or other
legal proceedings which may be brought
or instituted by third persons against
Licensor or their successors or assigns
on any such claim, demand or cause of
action; shall pay and satisfy any said
suit, action or other legal proceeding;
and shall reimburse Licensor for any and
all reasonable legal expenses incurred by
Licensor in connection herewith.
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor of Licensor, shall provide
Licensor with full and complete indemnification, including defense of any suits,
actions or other legal proceedings resulting from any claims for damages to property and injury or death to persons and
shall apply to all claims, demands, suits,
and judgments of whatever nature which

FREUND v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT

277

Cite as 625 F.Supp. 272 (D.Utah 1985)

shall be made or assessed against Li- law imposes on everyone: that of using
censor in furnishing such poles under the due care for the safety of himself and
terms of this agreement or for any other others." Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso,
thing done or omitted in conjunction with 408 P.2d at 913. The court then stated its
Licensors dealings with Licensee. (Em- understanding of the majority rule regardphasis added).
ing the interpretation of covenants purportThe first sentence of paragraph 21, un- ing to indemnify the indemnitee for its
derlined above, covers the present factual negligence:
The majority rule appears to be that in
situation. Jones argues that the sentence
most situations, where such is the desire
does not contain the kind of explicit lanof the parties, and it is clearly underguage required by Utah law in order to
hold an indemnitor accountable for an instood and expressed, such a covenant
demnitee's own negligence. Utah Power &
will be upheld. But the presumption is
Light, on the other hand, asserts that the
against any such intention, and it is not
first sentence must be read in conjunction
achieved by inference or implication from
with the following sentence. The first sengeneral language such as employed here.
tence is all inclusive, in contrast to the
It will be regarded as a binding contracsecond which expressly excludes indemnifitual obligation only when that intention
cation for the licensor's wrongdoing. Acis clearly and unequivocally expressed.
cording to Utah Power & Light, the par408 P.2d at 914.
ties' intention is clear: the utility company
The Utah Supreme Court has continued
is to be indemnified under any and all situations which arise out of or are connected to cite to its language in El Paso, quoted
with "the erection, maintenance, presence, above, when interpreting indemnity conuse, or removal" of Jones' equipment and tracts. See, e.g. Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff,
the indemnitor is to indemnify the indemni- 658 P.2d 1187, (1983); Union Pacific Railtee regardless of who is at fault. Utah road Co. v. Intermountain Farmer's AsPower & Light further argues that Utah sociation, 568 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1977).
law does not require "buzz words" in order Federal court decisions applying Utah law
to require an indemnitor to indemnify the have stressed that the parties' intention
indemnitee for the latter's negligent acts. must be "clearly and unequivocally expressed." Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton,
The Utah Supreme Court has applied a
365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.1966), Southern Pastrict interpretation standard when intercific
Transportation v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d
preting indemnity provisions similar to the
121,
123
(10th Cir.1971).
one now before the court. The Court set
forth the standard in clear terms in the
case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408
P.2d 910 (1965). The Court there was
called upon to interpret an indemnity contract given by a gas company seeking the
use of the railroads' easements for a pipeline. Although some of the factors influencing the court's deliberations in that case
are not present here, the general tenor of
the court's decision and its guidelines for
interpreting indemnity contracts are important. The court's conclusion favoring the
gas company rested in large measure on
the proposition that "the law does not look
with favor upon one exacting a covenant to
relieve himself of the basic duty which the

The question before the court, then is
whether the indemnity provisions of the
FAA express "clearly and unequivocally"
the intention* to indemnify Utah Power &
Light from losses attributable to its own
negligence. The court's interpretation
must be guided by the presumption against
such intention and the understanding that
indemnity agreements are strictly construed against the indemnitee. Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas, 17
Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965), Shell Oil
Co. v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d at 1189.
[4] Jones has directed the court's attention to only three situations where courts,
applying Utah law, have concluded that the
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language of the contract requires an indemnitor to cover for losses caused by the
indemnitee's own negligence. Those cases
are: Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1983); Titan Steel Corp, v.
Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.1966);
Southern Pacific Transportation v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.1971).
An examination of the indemnity provision in each of the above cases reveals that
each provision expressly states the scope of
the agreed upon indemnity. Each makes
explicit reference to the indemnitor's obligation to indemnify the indemnitee except
in situations where the injury has resulted
from the sole negligence of the indemnitee.
Each agreement discusses the effect of the
indemnitee's negligence.2
The relevant language of the FAA, however, does not contain similarly explicit language. The first sentence of paragraph 21
provides in general language for the licensee to indemnify the licensor for liability
arising out of "the erection, maintenance,
presence, use, or removal of licensee's
equipment
" Although the cause of
Mr. Freund's injuries comes clearly within
the scope of this provision, the sentence
2. The indemnity provision of the contract in
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1983) states in relevant portion:
... Contractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect, indemnify and save Operator [Shell], its
employees, and agents harmless from and
against all claims, demands and causes of
action of every kind and character arising in
favor of Contractor's employees, Operator's
employees or third parties on account of bodily injuries, death or damage to property arising out of or in connection with the performance of this agreement, except where such
injury, death or damage has resulted from the
sole negligence of Operator, without negligence wilfull act on the part of the Contractor, its agents, servants, employees, or subcontractors. Id. at 1189 (Emphasis added).
The factual situation presented in Shell Oil was
similar to the one before the court. It also
involved a controversy over an indemnity agreement between an employer covered by workmen's compensation and a third party who was
being sued by the employee.
The pertinent language from the agreement at
issue in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v.
Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.1971) states:
Buyer ... agrees to indemnify and save harmless Railroad ... from and against ... all

makes no reference to the intention of the
parties regarding whether the licensor
would be indemnified for its own negligence. Under Utah law, the language is
not sufficiently explicit. Moreover, the second sentence of paragraph 21, the construction of which Utah Power & Light relies on
to interpret the first sentence, covers
claims relating to the interruption of the
licensor's service. It does not relate to
personal injury claims. Its usefulness as
an aid in construing the intention of the
first sentence is thereby limited.
[5] The Utah court has made it plain
that unless the contract clearly and unequivocally deals with the indemnitee's
negligence, the indemnitee will not be indemnified against its own negligence. This
court reiterates the words of the Utah
court in Union Pacific Railroad Company
v. El Paso Natural Gas} 17 Utah 2d 255,
408 P.2d 910 (1965) in this regard:
If it had been the intent of the parties
that the defendant should indemnify the
plaintiff even against the latter's negligent acts, it would have been easy
enough to use that very language and to
liability ... regardless of any negligence or
alleged negligence on the part of any Railroad
employee or agent. Id. at 124. (Emphasis
added).
The court in Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton,
365 F.2d 542 (1966) decided that the intention of
the parties was revealed through two contracts.
The court did not distinguish between the language of the two in its discussion. One contract
stated:
... Contractor agrees to indemnify and hold
Owner harmless from liability for all losses,
... which may arise out of, or in connection
with, the performance of the Contract and
which are caused by any act, or omission, of
Contractor or subcontractors
Id. at 548.
Utah Power & Light points out that the above
agreement does not explicitly delineate the
scope of the indemnity obligations when the
injury is caused by the Owner's negligence. The
other contract however, which the Court in Titan considered in tandem with the first, does
use more explicit language. It states:
The subcontractor agrees to indemnify, ...
the Contractor and Owner against all claims
... except when caused by the sole negligence
of the Contractor or Owner.
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thus make that intent clear and unmistakable, which was not done here. Id,
408 P.2d pp. 913-914.

Company v. Idaho Stockyards Co., 364
P.2d 826 (Utah 1961).*
The requirement that an agreement state
Nor is the language of the FAA suffi- in express terms that an employer intends
ciently clear for this court to conclude that to indemnify third-parties for employee inthe parties intended that Jones contracted juries serves an important public policy.
away its workmen's compensation defense. The Workmen's Compensation laws provide
The Utah Supreme Court in Shell Oil v. employees with expedited compensation for
Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d 1187 (1983), held the loss of earning capacity in exchange for
that the exclusive remedy provision of the the relinquishment of their common law
Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code causes of action against the employer. The
Ann. § 35-1-60, did not necessarily invali- employer, in turn, gives up legal defenses
date an agreement under which the em- and must pay into a compensation fund in
ployer agreed to indemnify a third-party return for freedom from employee suits.
for amounts paid to its employees. Id. at Any change in this arrangement should not
1191. The court's holding in Shell Oil was be lightly inferred. Accordingly, an embased on an analysis of a contract that ployer's intention to waive its immunity
stated expressly that the indemnitor would must be clearly expressed in the agreeindemnify the indemnitee even for injuries ment.
caused to employees of the indemnitor.
The language of the FAA does not clearThe contract in Shell Oil provided that the ly express an intention to contract away
contractor would indemnify the operator the employer's (Jones) workman's compenfrom and against:
sation immunity. There is no reference to
. . . all claims, demands and causes of Jones' obligation to indemnify Utah Power
action of every kind and character aris- & Light for injuries caused to Jones' eming in favor of Contractor's employees, ployees. The FAA is neither clear enough
Operators employees or third parties on to overcome the presumption against an
account of bodily injuries, death or dam- indemnitee contracting away liability for
age to property arising out of or in con- his own negligence nor to overcome the
nection with the performance of this presumption against contracting away
agreement . . . Id. at 1189 n. 1.
one's employer immunity under Workmen's
Similarly, two other decisions applying Compensation.
Utah law have found the language of the
Breach of Contract to Provide
indemnity agreement in question sufficient
Liability Insurance
to overcome the workman's compensation
defense because the agreement specifically
Finally, Utah Power & Light contends
mentioned indemnification for injury to the that Jones must reimburse it for all losses
indemnitor's employees. See Titan Steel it might incur because Jones breached its
Corporation v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th contract to provide liability insurance for
Cir.1966); Oregon Shortline
Railroad the licensor's (UP & L) benefit. Utah Pow3. In Titan Steel v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th
Cir.1966), the contract included a provision requiring the contractors to indemnify:
for any and all claims arising from injury to
employees of Contractor, or injury to any
subcontractor or employees of such subcontractor arising from the performance of the
Contract, and for any injury to employees of
owner, or to third persons, or to the public, or
to their property, caused by any act, or omission of Contractor or subcontractors ... Id
at 547-48.

In Oregon Shortline Railroad Company v. Idaho
Stockyard Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 ?.2d
826 (1961), the contract provided that the contractor would indemnify the railroad against all:
... claims, demands, losses, costs and expenses of whatsoever nature which may arise
by reason of injury to or death of any of the
representatives or employees of the Contractor, or by reason of damage to or loss of any
property of the Contractor, or of his agents or
employees, or of others when in the custody
or control of the Contractor ... Id 364 P.2d
at 827.
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er's contention is based on its interpretation of paragraph 22 of the FAA. That
paragraph contains the following covenants
respecting the licensee's duty to insure for
the licensor's benefit.
Throughout the life of this agreement,
Licensee shall, in addition to and consistent with the provisions of Paragraph
21, maintain in full force and effect with
the carrier or carriers selected by Licensee and satisfactory to the Licensor: (1)
Compensation insurance in compliance
with all workmen's compensation insurance and safety laws of the State of
Utah and amendments thereto; and (b)
Bodily injury insurance with limits of
$500,000 for each person and $1,000,000
for each occurrence; and (c) Property
damage liability insurance with limits of
$250,000 for each accident and $300,000
aggregate.
The insurance described in (b) and (c)
above shall also provide contractual liability coverage satisfactory to Licensor with respect to all liabilities assumed by Licensee under the provisions of this agreement Policies of insurance obtained in compliance with the
requirements of this paragraph 22 shall
name Licensor as an additional insured,
and shall be sufficient to satisfy the indemnification provisions of Paragraph 21
and protect Licensor against any and
all claims for personal injury, death,
or property damage arising out of or
resulting from this agreement Licensee shall furnish to Licensor copies of all
policies of insurance obtained in compliance with this agreement prior to the
installation of any of Licensee's equipment upon said poles and prior to the
expiration of each policy year thereafter.
In addition, the Licensee shall submit to
Licensor certificates by each company
insuring Licensee to the effect that it has
insured Licensee under this agreement
and that it will not cancel or change any
policy of insurance issued to Licensee
except after thirty (30) days notice to
Licensor. (Emphasis added).
Utah Power & Light argues that the
underlined clauses indicate that the parties

to the FAA intended that the licensee's
obligation to insure was not limited to
those obligations that arise under paragraph 21's indemnity provisions. Rather,
Utah Power & Light is to be insured
against "any and all claims arising out of
or resulting from this agreement" including those not covered by the indemnity
provisions. In other words, Utah Power &
Light contends that the insurance provisions should be construed so as to provide
coverage for its own acts of negligence.
[6,7] Utah law in this regard is clear.
A requirement to provide insurance is governed by the same rule of construction as
an indemnification provision which seeks
indemnification for the indemnitee's own
negligence. Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
General Motors Corp, 730 F.2d 1380 (10th
Cir.1984). The intention of the parties regarding insurance coverage must be clearly
and unequivocally expressed when the action on the insurance agreement sounds as
an action for indemnification. Id. at 1382,
citing Union Pacific Railroad v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n., 568 P.2d 724,
726 (Utah 1977). If the actual effect of the
insurance agreement is to indemnify, then
the rules governing indemnification must
be applied. The court in Kennecott Copper states clearly that there is no difference between an agreement to purchase
insurance to cover the lessor's own acts
and an indemnification agreement 730
F.2d at 1382. In either case, the presumption against insuring oneself against one's
own acts will govern.
[8] When those standards are applied to
the FAA agreement, it is clear that the
insurance provisions of paragraph 22 can
not be construed as providing coverage beyond that contemplated for indemnification
under paragraph 21. The provisions do not
state explicitly that the insurance to be
provided should be such as to cover the
lessor's own negligent acts.
In summary, this court finds that Jones,
Konocti and Cable TV Fund VIII-B are the
employers of Freund, Bond, and Schmitt
within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
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pensation statutes of Utah. Under Utah
law, Cablemain is not entitled to assert a
common law indemnity claim against Jones.
The Facilities Attachment Agreement,
when examined by the exacting standards
of Utah law, does not require Jones to
indemnify Utah Power & Light (or any
other potential party to the FAA) for its
own negligence nor does it indicate a waiver of Jones' workmen's compensation defense. Finally, the FAA provisions governing the acquisition of insurance by Jones
on behalf of Utah Power & Light do not
require that Jones provide insurance for
Utah Power & Light's own acts.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. CablemahVs motion for summary
judgment is denied;
2. Utah Power & Light's motion for
summary judgment is denied; and
3. Jones Intercable, et al's motion for
summary judgment is granted.
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Wanda CARTER for Lakesha and
Felicia CARTER, Plaintiff,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant
Civ. A. No. 84-4649.
United States District Court,
E.D. Michigan, S.D.
Nov. 25, 1985.
Review was sought of denial by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services of
children's insurance benefits. The District
Court, Julian Abele Cook, Jr., J., adopting
report and recommendation of Steven D.
Pepe, United States Magistrate, held that:
(1) applicable state law under the inheri-

tance test of entitlement to children's benefits was that which existed at the time
Secretary rendered her final decision; (2)
substantial evidence supported finding of
administrative law judge that the children
in the instant case had inheritance rights
under Michigan law requiring a mutually
acknowledged relationship of parent and
child; and (3) inappropriate test had been
applied in determining support under the
other evidence of parentage test, given the
limited employment and income of wage
earner in the years before his death.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted and action remanded.
1. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=>137
Children born out of wedlock to wage
earner were not entitled to children's insurance benefits following his death under
court decree test, where decree entered by
state probate court establishing parentage
was entered after the wage earner's death.
Social Security Act, § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(III), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(III).
2. Statutes <&=>219(4)
Courts may reject an agency's interpretation when its regulations do not honor
the clear meaning of the statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history, or when the regulations are clearly
wrong or unreasonable.
3. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=>137
State inheritance laws as they existed
at the time the Secretary of Health and
Human Services rendered her final decision
were to be applied in determining whether
persons seeking children's insurance benefits were to be regarded as children of
deceased wage earner under the inheritance
test
[Social
Security
Act,
§ 216(h)(2)(A), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 416(h)(2)(A)], and thus regulation [Social
Security
Administration
Regulations,
§ 404.354, 42 U.S.C.A.App.] providing that
state law at the time of wage earner's
death was controlling was inconsistent with

EXHIBIT "E"

PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this 2%_ day of

#l/(p*

,

1981, by and between Karveon Sign Company, a Utah corporation
("Seller11) , Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah

corporation

("Buyer") , and those persons whose names are set forth on the
signature page hereof as all stockholders

of the

Seller,

("Stockholders").
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller
desires to convey to Buyer certain assets of the Seller as mere
particularly described and set forth herein;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and
covenants set forth herein and for other good and valuable
consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, it
is agreed as follows:
Section 1.
a.

Assignment of Contract Rights and Disolavs.

Seller hereby assigns to Buyer all rights of Seller no

renew all sign lease agreements and sign maintenance agreements set
forth in Schedule A hereto and all such agreements entered into
after the date hereof but prior to closing in the normal course of
business (it being intended that as soon as practical, Schecule A
shall be updated to include all such additional agreements) and,
subject to performance by 3uyer of all of its obligations under
this Agreement, assigns and transfers to Buyer upon the expiration
of each such sign lease agreement all right, title and interest of
Seller free and clear of all liens or encumbrances of any kind, in

nnrt'jQi;

the Displays which are subject thereto (the ''Displays1') except for
such of the Displays as are subject to transfer to the lessee by
reason of a purchase option heretofore granted to such lessee.
Such leases or agreements containing a purchase option to the
lessee shall be so designated on attached Schedule B.

Seller shall

be entitled to a commission of fifteen percent of all job contracts
pursuant to which no production has commenced prior to the date of
closing hereunder but which job contracts have been sold in the
ordinary course of business prior to the date of closing hereunder.
All such job contracts are listed in Schedule "N" hereto.

Seller

shall not, directly or indirectly, interfere with or atter.pt to
inhibit Buyer in Buyer's efforts to renew or continue business
relationships

with

customers

upon expiration

of

applicable

agreements identified in this paragraph or other paragraphs hereof.
b.

It: is further agreed that Seller may be unable to transfer

title to certain of the leased signs subject to third-party sign
location leases as more particularly set forth on Schedule C
attached hereto.
c.

It: is further agreed that those certain leases listed in

attached Schedule D are leases which by agreement do not include
maintenance

or insurance and therefore renewal rights and/or

residual payment for title transfer at the end thereof remain the
property of Seller
d.

Seller will take all steps necessary to allow Buyer to

continue Seller's obligations under the lease and maintenance
agreements including, where necessary, obtaining the consent cf the
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user of the Display.

All leases and ether items of property

excluded from purchase and retained by Seller are listed on
Schedule D and Schedule E, or in the event not listed on another
Schedule attached hereto are excluded from the terms hereof.
Section 2. Assumption of Certain Contractual Obligations.
a.

Buyer agrees to satisfy, perform and discharge when cue

all obligations of Seller (excluding

f,

sales taxes1' if any, imposed

in respect to the remaining term of sign lease agreements)
hereinafter arising under said sign lease agreements and sign
maintenance agreements until their respective expiration dates,
including but not limited to service, maintenance and replacement
of parts, and Buyer further agrees to pay when cue all personal
property taxes assessed against said Displays in respect of all
periods ending subsequent to the effective date hereof and to
'provide, at its expense, insurance coverage adequate to full>i
protect Seller against property damage

(including

damage to

Displays and integral parts) or personal injury or death claims
arising

out of

the

ownership, maintenance, use, service,

transportations, or installation of Displays' in a minimum amount of
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).

buch insurance shall include

insurance against damage to said displays
b.

Buyer assumes no liabilities or obligations of Seller

except as specifically described and set forth herein.
c.
sign

Buyer shall have the right to file and Seller agrees to

reasonable

forms

of

financing

statements

or

security

agreements to secure Buyer's' interests in the underlying signs.
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Section 3.
a.

Inventory.

Seller hereby further agrees to sell and assign to Buyer,

and Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller, all right, title, and
interest of Seller in all inventories of materials, parts and
components not included in work in process, owned by Seller as of
the date hereof.

Said inventories shall be as set forth on

Schedule F attached hereto and the total purchase price shall be as
set forth on Schedule F.

Terms of the purchase price payment shall

be as outlined in Section 13 hereof.

The original inventory list

shall be as of July 31, 1981, and shall be updated at closing.
b.

All items listed

in the Schedule of inventories of

materials, parts, and components

shall be in new or usable

condition as of the closing date and must be approved by Buyer at
closing.
Section 4.
a.

Equipment.

Seller hereby agrees to sell and Buyer hereby agrees to

purchase those certain items of property, and equipment, including
rolling stock as listed on Schedule G, attached hereto.

Payment of

the purchase price shall not include the assumption of any
liabilities, but shall include those other terms and conditions as
set forth in Section 13, hereof.

The price shall be based on the

higher of fair market value or book value for each such item.
b.

All such items of property, and equipment, including

rolling stock shall be in good working condition and in a
reasonably good state of repair as of the closing date.
Section 5.

Work in Process.

-4-
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listed in Schedule "N" hereto.
Section 6

Sign Face Molds

Seller shall furnish to Buyer all sigi 1 face molds w h i c h are
available
1

v.-: which w e r e used in the production cf the Displays
ib j e c t :: f 11 11 s 1 Lgr e en 1 en t.

Section 7. Failure of Title.
In the event that Seller is unable to pass title to Buyer to
any Display as contemplated by this Agreement at the termination of
the sign lease agreement applicable thereto, exclusive cf Displays

which are the subject of purchase options (for which provisions is
made in Section 1 of this Agreement), then Seller shall reimburse
Buyer for all maintenance theretofore performed by Buyer with
respect to such Display based on costs shown on Buyer's monthly
contract status report, and including personal property taxes and
sign floater insurance paid, if any, subject, however, to audit by
Seller.

Buyer's costs shall include labor, materials, and 27%

added thereto as overhead.
Section 8.
a.

Seller's Real Estate Lease.

Buyer hereby agrees to assume, as of the date of closing,

that certain real estate lease dated Kay 1, 1973, by and between
Seller and David F. and Bessie B. Sawyer.

3uyer agrees to

faithfully perform and -discharge the terms and conditions of said
lease.

Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a sublease on terms

and conditions of said Sawyer lease.
b.

Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a lease en terms

and conditions similar to the terms of the Sawyer lease with regard
to additional land and improvements at the Marveon shop:

The

rental for which shall be $500 per month.
c.

The Sawyer lease, assignment and consent of Lessors, and

the other lease are attached hereto as Schedule I, J, and K.

The

consent to assignment by Seller to Buyer shall provide for the
ability of Buyer to sublease the Sawyer premises to a third party
without the consent of the Sawyers.
Section 9.

Contract Rewrites.
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Schedu.
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.
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Section ..G.

Emnlovees.

a.
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t:e A '# employed by Sell-r

date

- c-cy -.. . . . . . .
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connection with Seller'?

sign

bi is: ness
b.

Buyer agrees to offer employment to Douglas Brcvn, R.ay

Draper, zr i Dennis Remy at not less th a i I the: r current salaries and
]

,

ing per iocs foi 3u> erVs

benefits, to the extent

legally

possible

to allow

employment
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seniority in v P 1 at I nil to sahl benef ^ r s . •
c
t:

Buyer agrees to retain Seller as a consultant with regard

u'iness

assumed

hereunder

=:>' *

(
t^

iy Seller
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i: t .: ie first
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Seller mav a"
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to represent Buyer in sales promotion activities, and shall be
entitled to standard commissions and approved expenses for any and
all contracts negotiated by Seller on behalf of Buyer which such
contracts are acceptable to Buyer.
d.

Buyer agrees to provide Seller with a copy of its annual

audited financial statements until all terms hereof have been
performed.
Section 11.

Eminent Domain.

In the event that Buyer is required to remove or alter any of
the

Displays

by reason of eminent

domain or

condemnation

proceedings under circumstances whereunder the effect of such
removal or alteration.would render the effected Display unavailable
for transfer to Buyer at the expiration of the applicable sign
lease agreement in substantially the condition or location now
existing, then, in such event, Seller shall be responsible for the
cost of removal or alteration of such Display and shall be entitled
to receive any condemnation award in connection with the required
removal or alteration.

Section 9 hereof shall then apply to

reimbursement of Buyer's costs to date of such removal.
Section 12.

Billing of Seller's Customers.

Seller shall establish a system and. be responsible for billing
on all accounts for the benefit of Seller with respect to those
accounts wherein Buyer has assumed maintenance responsibilities
under Section One hereof.

Buyer shall have the right to examine

the billing records at any reasonable time.
Section 13.

Pavment of Purchase Price.

-
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the First
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Section 14.
The
will

SV'llpr
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warranty,

Conveyances.
hPTi'v
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to Buyer such bills of sale with

endorsements,

iiio LI LIM-MIL • ul
satisfactory
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assignments,

transfer,

t>« Buyer

and

assignment,
its

covenants

of

;

t

general

and other eor.d ;--i! sufficient
and

conveyance.

counsel, as shall be

In

form

effective

to

vest in Buyer good and marketable title to all of the properties
and assets of the Seller being purchased hereunder, except as to
those liens and encumbrances as listed on Schedule L hereto.
Section 15.

Delinquent Accounts.

Seller shall notify Buyer of any sign lease agreement or sign
maintenance agreement that becomes more than 60 days delinquent in
payment, and, Buyer's obligation to any sign lease agreement more
than 60 days delinquent shall be suspended upon notice from Seller
until

the

account

has

been paid current

or

arrangements

satisfactory to Seller have been made for payment of the account.
In the event any of the Displays are repossessed by Seller cue to
the lessee's default, title thereto shall be transferred to Buyer
only when (i) Buyer has paid all costs of repossession, in which
event Buyer shall be responsible for all further expenses in
connection with said Display, or (ii) at the conclusion of probable
or existing litigation involving said Display in which event Buyer
shall hold and protect said Display in storage for Seller until any
such litigation has been concluded, not to exceed 1 year after the
expiration of the Underlying Customer Agreement.

Seller shall

reimburse Buyer for any required reinstallation expense.
Section 16.

Free Access to Plants, Properties, and Records.

The Seller shall give to Buyer and to its counsel, accountants
and other representatives, and to independent auditors selected by
it, free and full access, during normal business hours, throughout
the period from the date hereof to the Closing, to all of the
Seller's properties, books, contracts, leases, commitments, and
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records,' and the Seller shall furnish Buyer during this period with
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hi:ri::unnie r , unless I !. '..„'» »•-• • i i: t:. r i • d luLu- J i llv. i,-i:dinary courts oi the
Seller's business and does no t: cons t i tut e a br each of" any c t* t he
representations and warranties set fcrrh in rirr," ,c>r f ion
c.

The Seller

her^f

and the Stockholders will use their

best

efforts to preserve for Buyer the good will of all the firms and
per ? en r h •H1 '' Pr! ^i|1,,J *_r, t; i; '.v 11? I a > LI, E'Ib w j, i; !;i. ", »-1, !. H! , L_.no
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"The Seller will duly comply with all laws applicable to i ;;

and to the conduct of its business.
Section 1 8 . Actions bv the Seller and the Stockholders

on a^d
-

—

after the Closing.
a
use a 11

Th e S e 1 1 e r a: : d 11 i e S t c: • c k h o 1 d e i: s " ? i 1 1 c o o p e i a t e , = ,/i I d 1|; ;
reasonable

other employees

efforts t:o have the of f icers , cirectors f and

of the Company

cooperate, with
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Buyer

at i ts

<

*

request, on and after the Closing Date, in endeavoring to conduct
its business.
b.

The

Seller and the Stockholders agree to use all

reasonable efforts to persuade those employees of the Seller that
Buyer may designate to become employees of Buyer after the Closing
Date.
c.

Except as provided in Section 10.c. above, Seller agrees

to refer all calls received by Seller for new work including sales
leads, maintenance, installation, etc. to Buyer.

Seller shall

coordinate all such sales activities under Section 10.c. with the
appropriate representative of Buyer.
Section 19.

The Closing.

The purchase of assets described in this Agreement shall be
consummated at Closing to be held at the offices of counsel for
Buyer in Salt Lake City, Utah, at 4:00 P.M., local time, on the 2nd
day of September, 1981, or at such other place, time, and date as
the parties hereto shall mutually agree upon.

The date and event

of such purchase of assets are, respectively, herein referred to as
the

,f

Closing Date11 and the "Closing."

Section 19.

Representations, Warranties, and Covenants of the

Seller.
The Seller and the Stockholders, severally, hereby represent,
warrant, and covenant to Buyer as follows:
a.

The Seller is a corporation duly organized and in good

standing under the laws of the State of Utah.

The Seller has the

power to own its properties and assets and to carry on its business
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a d m i r a l t y , or b e f o r e or by ::ny f e d e r a l , s t a t e , m u n i c i p a l , i i o t h e r
g o v e m m e n t a 1 deTr"'<arrriKM,, r p i nmm"i s s i n11 (
instrumentality,

domestic

against: the a s s e t s

being

or

foreign,

purchased

ui : 1 e s s L i s c I ."':.) v1 j h e r e in .

I i,• i' , 1 1 p r * j M
d'MM involve

or c o n t r a c t s

« ni

i r

a n ; ilaira

being

assumed,

e.

In all material respects, the Seller has performed and

abided by all the obligations required to be performed by it to the
date hereof with respect to contracts assumed by Buyer, and will
continue to abide by and perform them up to and including the
Closing Date, and the Seller is not in default and to the extent
that it will be materially affected adversely under a license,
permit, order, authorization, grant, agreement, lease, or other
document, order, or regulation to which it is a party or by.which
it is bound, affecting such contracts.
f.

The Seller has complied in all material respects with all

applicable statutes and regulations of any governmental authority
having jurisdiction over it or applicable to its business.
g.

In the conduct of its business during the preceding three

years and as now operated, the Seller has not infringed any United
States or foreign patents of others.

The Seller owns or possesses

adequate license or other rights to use all trademarks, trace
names, and copyrights that are employed in the conduct: of its
business and has not received any notice of conflict with any
asserted rights of others that remain in effect.
h.

By appropriate vote of its Board of Directors and by

either the unanimous written consent of its stockholders or their
unanimous vote at a meeting duly called, convened, and held, all in
accordance with law and its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws,
the Seller has full power to execute and perform this Agreement and
to transfer its properties and assets as herein provided, and such
execution and performance does not conflict with any provisions of

-14-

000348

its A r t i c l e s
which

if i
i.

of Incorporation

or B y l a w s rr w i t h a n y c o n t r a c t to

i i n l > i i I i ,'l i i In i f i

None

i il H I t .•

at; tin1 Seller* s p r o p e r t i e s

and assets

t r a n s f e r r e d to B u y e r pursuant to thi s A g r e e m e n t

to b e

is s u b j e c t to a n y

i"e s t, 11 c L i oi i :::: i: 1 i mI ta11 oi i pi o 1: Iib i t ing , r e s tr ic t i n g , o r r equir ing
any consent to such transfer unless specifically denoted hex ein.
j

ifl 11ached hei: e t o

a s S ::::he :ii I 1 e N ai I• I 1 iereby

iriad 2 a p ar t

hereof is a detailed schedule of all o f the Seller * s jo bs tl : at, as
of
b

*"he date h e r e o f , had been sold i n the ordinary course of
ess :::>f 11 Ie Se"1 1 ei: and upon which procuction had not cozzzenced

showing, with respect to each such j o b , the job number, the name of
the pur c haser , (1 e s see) , and 11 i e tota 1 cont ra c t pr i c e
k

Eac 1 I o f the representations and warranties set forth in

this Section shall bo N'uo at and as of the time of Closing w: tin,
ti.e . due L i c. aii J eiiect au though ir.aati at and a c c:

-. c , i

Closing.
S e c t i o n 21 „

R e p r e sen t a t ions , 1\ arr an t ie s JLT \d C c v e n a n t s cf B u> er .

Suyer h e r e b y r e p r e s e n t s , w a r r a n t s , a n d covenants tc t h e Seller
and _ v Stockholders is follows:
r
and

........

. y o r g an i z e d , v a 1 i d 1 y existing,

- z : ? . " standing under the laws of the State of Utah, and is

d u 1 y qu a 1 i f i e u
j u r i . n o t i o n s wh^r-

f o i e i g n c o r p ::: i : a t: I • ::: • i i i i
^M.

Purchaser has f u l l
exe

., i s i n e s s .
power,
^greement

i i i accordance with law,
(i

! <;11rh e x e c u t i o n

to

ar id

p e r f o r m a n c e d o e s n e t conflict, w i t h a n y ^rcv-isicns of i t s A r t i c l e s

c ]1

of Incorporation or bylaws, as amended to the date hereof, or with
any contract to which it is a party or to which it is subject.

The

Board of Directors of Buyer has authorized, or before the Closing
will have authorized, this Agreement, the transactions contemplated
herein, and the execution and delivery hereof.
c.

Each of the representations and warranties set forth in

this Section shall be true at and as of the time of Closing with
the same force and effect as though made at and as of the time of
Closing, and shall survive the Closing.
Section 22.

Conditions Precedent to the Buyer's Obligations.

All obligations of Buyer to be discharged under this Agreement
at the Closing are subject to fulfillment prior to or at the
Closing of each of the following conditions, unless expressly
waived in writing by Buyer at any time prior to the Closing:
a.

Buyer shall not have discovered any material error,

misstatement, or omission in their representations, warranties, and
covenants made by the Seller and the Stockholders herein.
b.

The representations, warranties and covenants of the

Seller and the Stockholders set forth herein shall be deemed to
*

have been made again at and as of the time of Closing and then
shall be true in all material respects, except as modified as of
the time of Closing to the extent necessary to reflect intervening
transactions expressly permitted hereunder; the Seller and the
Stockholder shall have performed and complied with all the terms,
covenants, and conditions required by this Agreement

to be

performed by them prior to or at the Closing.
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c.

T h e Bulk Sales L a w o f the State of Utah h a s b e e n

w i t h HI]" is i n a p p l i c a b l e

Lu ill i., t r . i n M r f i m

complied

and i:h«1ln i I Hereby

Indemnities Bu>er with regard lo any elaiiis t h e r e u n d e r .
' d. T h e s c h e d u l e s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o shall i n d i c a t e a l l l e a c e s ,
s ig11","

i:, "(u i pi:ie111

d e b t of S e l l e r ,

t'l 111! ot,! 11j i a s s e t s pI ed£,ed t

i! J '

b ecure a n v

Buyei' shall h a v e nhe vighr. t o r e v i e w a l l l o a n

d o c u m e n t s and p l e d g e a g r e e m e n t s rel at i n j', t o such asset-""• ai i :i d E •!: t
ar "! shall Lie enf„ i, t led to satisfy i t s e l f , prior r i c l o s i n g , as to
the ability of Seller to pay o f f such debt so as to e n a b l e Seller
II"

| i I " "",

I iI I

I"

,1,1 ,i I" l

,ii ".„, "; (:! I", ',

1

["ill, I " > I i |

Section 2 3 . C o n d i t i o n s P r e c e d e n t to the O b l i g a t i o n s o f t h e Seller
and the S t o c k h o l d e r s
AI 1 o b l i g a t i o n s o f the S e l l e r and the S t o c k h o l d e r s

to b e

d i s c h a r g e d u n d e r this A g r e e m e n t a r e sub j ect to the f ul f i l l m e n t ,
p r i I'»ii • i

i , 11

i'

i 11 n e

c: f C1 o s i n g , :::: f • a a :::: 1: 1 ::> f 11 1 e f 011 owing

conditions, unless waived in

writing by the Seller a nd

t: .e

Stockholders at any time prior to tl le CI o s i n g :
a,
shall
t

^

Buyer's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

and w a r r a n t i e s set f o r t h

herein

deemed to have been m a d e again at ard a r of rhp n ^ e cf
'fi);!, .iir, I i" !ii:' I i

i MI»! in .ii ' I U U L U i• i I i n s p e c t s

Duver

s h a l l h a v e p e r f o r m e d a n d c o m p l i e d w i t h all! c o v e n a n t s , a g r e e m e n t s ,
and
pr .

e d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d b y thin A g r e e m e n t to he p a r f o r r r d r,n M
: • ::> • ::: 1: : t t h e time 0 f C l o s i n g .

Section 24.

Nature and Survival of Representations, Warranties,

Covenants, and Agreements.
Buyer, the Seller, and the S t o c k h o l d e r s agree that:

1.

Their respective representations and warranties set forth

in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and thereafter shall be
fully effective and enforceable, and shall not be affected by any
investigation, verification, or approval by any party hereto or by
anyone on behalf of any such party;
2.

Their respective covenants and agreements set forth in

this Agreement, except those covenants and agreements that are
required, expressly by this Agreement to be fully kept, performed,
and discharged on or before the Closing, shall survive the Closing
and thereafter shall be fully effective and enforceable;
3.

After the Closing and prior to any dissolution of the

Seller, the representations

and warranties and the surviving

covenants and agreements herein made by the Seller shall be binding
upon, performed by, and enforceable against the Seller, except that
all the costs of such performance shall be borne and paid by the
Stockholders;
4.

In the

event

of dissolution

of the Seller, all

representations and warranties herein made by either the Seller,
the Stockholders, or both

and

the surviving

covenants and

agreements herein made by either the Seller, the Stockholders, or
both, shall be deemed to be assumed by the Stockholders;
5.

No liability of the Seller for or by reason of breach of

any of its said representations, warranties, covenants, and
agreements shall be deemed to be a liability of the Seller assumed
by Buyer hereunder, but, on the contrary, shall remain the
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liability of the Seller, the Stockholders, or both, as provided
herein.
Section 25.
a.

Etn^lovment and Noncompetition.

Buyer shall not have any obligations with respect to

hiring or any other matters as to present or past employees of the
Seller.
b.

The Seller and all Stockholders of the Seller shall enter

into a noncompetition agreement in the form attached hereto as
Schedule 0.
Section 26. Miscellaneous.
a.

The Seller, or, after its dissolution, its surviving

directors, trustees, or receiver, and the Stockholders, at any tire
and from time to time after the Closing Date, upon the request of
Buyer

and without

further

consideration, will do, execute,

acknowledge, and deliver all such further actions, deeds, bills of
sale, assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney, and
assurances, and will take such other action, as reasonably may be
required by Buyer, to assign, convey, transfer, and deliver to, and
vest in, Buyer and put it in possession of, and protect its right
and title to, interest in, and enjoyment of, the properties and
assets of the

Seller

intended

to be

assigned,

conveyed,

transferred, and delivered pursuant to this Agreement.
b.

Subject to the terms, provisions, and conditions hereof,

this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit
of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, and assigns.

c.

Any notice, request, instruction, or other document to be

given hereunder to any party shall be in writing, delivered
personally or sent by registered mail or certified United States
Air Mail, postage prepaid, or telegram as follows:
Addresses of the Parties:
Young Electric Sign Company
c/o Thomas Young, Jr. President
P.O. Box 25728
Salt Lake City, UT 84125
Marveon Sign Company
c/o Glen Jerry Brown
4875 Knollwood Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Any party may change his or its address for purposes of this
paragraph by giving notice of change of address to the other
parties in the manner herein provided for giving notice.
d.

This instrument contains the entire agreement between the

parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby
and shall not be changed or terminated except by a written
instrument signed by the parties hereto.
e.

All

exhibits

and

Schedules

attached

hereto

are

incorporated herein.
f.

This Agreement is declared to have been made under the-

laws of the State of Utah.
g.

The section and other headings contained in this Agreement

are for reference purposes only and shall not in any way affect the
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
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h.

This Agreement may be executed

counterparts, and

in any number of

all of these counterparts

together

shall

constitute one and the same Agreement.
i.

The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision hereof

shall not affect nor impair any other provision hereof.
j.

The failure of any party to enforce the provisions of this

Agreement shall not constitute a waiver unless specifically stated
in writing, signed-by the party whose rights are deemed waived,
regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder.
k.

In the event of default, the defaulting party shall be

liable for all reasonable costs of enforcement including attorney's
fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this
Agreement to be duly executed as of the day and year first above
written.
MARVEON ^GjWCOKPANY ^ ^ — s

YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN CCXPANY

By: ^ /

A^^^f^^

^ /y"

IEON STOCKHOLDERS:

MarvaTS. Brown, StocK.no3.der
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EXHIBIT "F"

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
MARVEON SIGN COMPANY
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an individual
and personal representative of
the Estate of John W. Pickhover;
CATHERINE PICKHOVER, an individual; and GLORIA PICKHOVER, an
individual,

ANSWER AND CROSSCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; SMITH'S FOOD
KING PROPERTIES, a Utah corporation, DEE'S, INC., a Utah corporation; YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
MARVEON SIGN COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and IMAGE NATIONAL,
INC., an Idaho corporation,

Civil No. C85-4307

Defendants.

ANSWER
Defendant Marveon Sign Company answers plaintiff's complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted as to this defendant.

SECOND DEFENSE
The negligence of this defendant/ if any# and any is
expressly denied, was not the legal cause, the proximate cause
or the cause in fact of the death of John W. Pickhover, the
injuries of Toshiko Pickhover or the damages of which plaintiffs
complain,
THIRD DEFENSE
The death of John W. Pickhover was caused or proximately
contributed to by the negligence of John W. Pickhover, and
plaintiffs1 damages are either barred or reduced accordingly,
FOURTH DEFENSE
The damages of which plaintiffs complain were proximately
caused by the negligence or other actionable conduct of others
who this defendant did not and could not control.
FIFTH DEFENSE
The injuries of Toshiko Pickhover were caused or proximately contributed to by the negligence of Toshiko Pickhover,
and her damages are either barred or reduced accordingly.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs1 complaint is barred because plaintiffs
assumed the risk.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
This defendant responds to the number of paragraphs of
the Complaint as follows:
1.

Admits

2 through 7.

This defendant is without information

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of

the allegations of paragraphs 2 through 7,
and therefore denies the same.
8. Admits.
9 through 14. This defendant is without information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of paragraphs 9 through 14,
and therefore denies the same.
15.

This defendant admits that it built a sign in
1978 and installed it at Smith's Food King at
2039 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah in 1978 and
maintained that sign until 1981, and this
defendant denies each and every other allegation
of paragraph 15.

16.

This defendant is without information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 16, and therefore denies
the same.

17 through 84, the first through seventh claims for
relief.

This defendant denies each and every

other allegation of paragraphs 17 through 84,
the first through seventh claims for relief to
the extent that they may be reasonably construed
to be directed towards this defendant.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
This defendant denies each and every other allegation of
plaintiffs' complaint not specifically herein admitted.

NINTH DEFENSE
This defendant did not owe plaintiffs any duty.
TENTH DEFENSE
Under Utah law there is no such tort as negligent infliction of emotional stress.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
As an affirmative defense, this defendant alleges that
since 1981 it did not maintain the sign, it had no power or
ability to control the sign or the premises where the sign
was located, and further, this defendant alleges that in 1984
some three years after this defendant last performed any maintenance on the sign, the premises where the sign was located
were extensively remodeled.
CROSSCLAIM
This defendant crossclaims against Smith's Management
Corporation, Smith's Food King Properties, Dee's Inc., Young
Electric Sign Company, and Image National, Inc. as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' filed a complaint which alleges, gen-

erally, that plaintiffs' decedent was killed on the premises
at Smith's Food King at 2039 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah,
and that plaintiff Toshiko Pickhover was injured at the same
time and place as a result of a falling sign striking their
bodies.
2.

Although this defendant built the sign and installed

the same in 1978 and maintained it until 1981, this defendant
had no ability or power to control the premises or maintain the
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sign since 1981.
3.

In 1981, this defendant sold its maintenance contract

with Smith's Food King to defendant Young Electric. Young
Electric maintained the sign until that maintenance contract
expired in 1984.
4.

Smith's Food King then entered into a maintenance

contract with either Young Electric or defendant Image/ or both.
5.

In 1984 the premises where the sign was located were

extensively remodeled, which substantially altered the entire
physical plant as it related to the defendant's prior acts
covering the sign.
6.

The negligence or other actionable conduct of this

defendant, and any is expressly denied, was secondary and passive
to the active and primary negligence or other actionable fault
of cross-defendants.
7.

In the event a judgment is returned in favor of plain-

tiffs and against this defendant, this defendant is entitled to
be fully indemnified by cross-defendants.

In the alternative,

this defendant is entitled to contribution from cross-defendants
in the full amount of any such judgment or to the full extent
authorized by the Utah Contribution Statute.
WHEREFORE, having answered plaintiffs' complaint, this
defendant prays that the same be dismissed, and that it be
awarded it's costs incurred herein including reasonable attorney's
fees and costs and such other relief as the court deemed just
and appropriate.

In the event that a judgment is entered in

favor of plaintiff and against this defendant, this defendant
-
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prays for indemnification and/or contribution from crossdefendants for the full amount of any such judgment entered
in favor of plaintiff, and for such other relief as the court
deems just and appropriate in the circumstances, including
costs and fees incurred herein and a reasonable attorney's fee.
DATED this

ZA day of August, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rob^ft H. Henderson
Attorneys for Defendant
Marveon Sign
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